By John Stang
Cascade Natural Gas’ Kennewick district has 53.34 miles of high-pressure pipeline.
But it cannot provide documents to show that 22.12 of those miles — or about 40 percent of its pipelines in and around Kennewick — have been tested to confirm they can resist 60 pounds per square inch of pressure.
Across Washington, Kennewick-based Cascade Natural Gas does not have the paperwork to prove that slightly less than 40 percent of its 559.67 miles of high-pressure pipelines can handle the 60 pounds-per-square-inch standard, according the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission.
There are percentages worse than the Kennewick district’s. In Cascade’s Bellingham district, 56 percent of 105.5 miles of high-pressure pipelines could not be confirmed as safe. For Cascade’s Mount Vernon district, safety test records were missing for almost 53 percent of its 103.9 miles. The Yakima district could not prove the safety of 52 percent of its 50.5 miles of high-pressure pipelines.
That led to the WUTC’s staff proposing a $4 million fine against Cascade Natural Gas, which the utility is appealing.
Cascade Natural Gas declined to comment on the WUTC’s complaint, saying its case is stated in a legal response filed July 29.
That response said the corporation is systematically reviewing and addressing the record shortcomings, and that the WUTC should not base its fine on the individual numbers of days between its staff’s requests for compliance and the answers provided by Cascade Natural Gas.
Cascade’s attorneys from the Seattle law firm of Perkins Coie also wrote that the high-pressure lines have not been operated above 30 percent of the maximum pressure allowed under state pipeline safety regulations.
The state’s and Cascade’s attorneys recently proposed starting settlement talks on Sept. 21 with a status report due to state administrative judge Marguerite Frielander by Nov. 1. If the case continues, the two sides said they will file additional information and arguments with an evidentiary hearing tentatively set for March 22, 2017.
Frielander said she would take that proposed schedule under advisement.
The problem dates back to 2010 when a Pacific Gas & Electric pipeline exploded in San Bruno, California, sending flames roughly 1,000 feet into the air, killing eight people and destroying at least 35 homes. Causes included bad welds, inconsistent thicknesses in the pipes and poor record keeping, according to various reports.
That explosion prompted WUTC staff to increase scrutiny of similar factors in Washington, said Joe Subsits, chief engineer of WUTC’s pipeline safety program.
During a spring 2013 routine inspection of a pipeline near Kalama, Cascade could not produce documents on what the “maximum allowable operating pressure” of that buried pipe should be. A few weeks later, Cascade could not produce documents on the “maximum allowable operating pressure” during a similar pipeline inspection at Bellingham.
Suspecting that could be a system-wide issue, WUTC requested that Cascade check all of its records pertaining to “maximum allowable operating pressures.”
Cascade soon replied that it was missing such records for 28 pipeline segments in Washington. In October 2013, these records were discovered missing in a WUTC inspection of a Cascade pipeline near the Columbia River’s eastern bank about eight miles downstream from Burbank. Six months later, Cascade told the WUTC that it lacked such records for 98 pipeline segments.
“They kept coming back to us with very inconsistent information,” Subsits said.
In February 2015, Cascade agreed to turn in a comprehensive report on this issue to the WUTC by Aug. 12, 2015. It missed that deadline and turned in that report on Jan 29, 2016. In a legal filing, Cascade said the delay was due to a key person being unavailable.
WUTC staff concluded that the January report was insufficient, and Cascade submitted a new one on April 29. WUTC staff is reviewing that report to see if it meets the state’s requirements.
“Overall, staff finds that Cascade has demonstrated a lax attitude toward compliance that exposes the public to an unacceptable level of risk. As shown by the 2010 explosion in San Bruno, California, which killed eight people, inadequate oversight can have catastrophic consequences,” a July 12 WUTC staff report said.
“The large number of segments lacking (maximum allowable operating pressures) confirming documents raises obvious public safety concerns. But equally concerning is the change in Cascade’s data over time,” the WUTC staff’s July 12 report said.
The WUTC staff reported that Cascade provided it with four different figures on four different dates of how many pipeline segments lack documented results on pressure tests. That breakdown is as follows:
“The fluctuations … call into question Cascade’s ability to provide accurate data. The shifting data suggests that Cascade does not know its system well enough to pinpoint exactly how many Washington high pressure pipeline segments it is operating with insufficient (maximum allowable operating pressure) confirming documentation,” the WUTC staff’s July 12 report said.
Subsits said the amount of required fix-it work is still up in the air.
“First of all, they’re going to have to inventory the system and find out what’s missing.”
“What they’re required to do depends on what’s missing,” he said.